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Abstract
The approach set forth by Edward Craig in Knowledge and the State of Nature has a 
greater explanatory value than it has been granted to date, and his suitably modified 
project can resolve a number of puzzling issues regarding the value of knowledge. 
The paper argues that a novel theory that relates knowledge to testimony is capable 
of explaining why knowledge is more valuable than mere true belief and why it has a 
distinctive value. Significantly, this theory avoids the recently advanced revisionism 
regarding the focus of epistemological research.
Keywords: E. J. Craig, knowledge, testimony, value.
Resumen
La aproximación de Edward Craig en Knowledge and the State of Nature tiene más 
poder explicativo del apreciado hasta ahora, y su proyecto, adecuadamente modifica-
do, puede resolver un número de asuntos sobre el valor del conocimiento que parecen 
desconcertantes. Se argumenta que una novedosa teoría de conocimiento que lo re-
laciona con el testimonio puede explicar por qué el conocimiento es más valioso que 
la mera creencia verdadera, y por qué tiene un valor distintivo. Significativamente, 
la teoría evita un revisionismo, recientemente avanzado, con respecto al foco de la 
investigación epistemológica.
Palabras clave: E. J. Craig, conocimiento, testimonio, valor.
[89]
ideas y valores · vol. lxiv · n.o 159 • diciembre 2015 • issn 0120-0062 (impreso) 2011-3668 (en línea) • bogotá, colombia • pp. 87–107
Testimony and Value in the Theory of Knowledge
Epistemology has experienced a bit of a renaissance within the last 
fifty years and much of this can be traced back to Edmund Gettier’s 
(1963) famous paper. Suddenly there was a puzzle that became the cen-
tre of attention, namely the nature of knowledge, and since then there 
has been no shortage of proposals attempting to identify what has to 
be added to true belief in order to get knowledge. But the standard 
method to develop these views relies very heavily on intuitions about 
cases and there are at least two reasons to be wary about it. First, these 
proposals have their own counterexamples with no sign of developing 
a successful one given their own standards (cf. Millar 2010). Second, 
they are anyway likely to be quite complex and gerrymandered (and the 
more successful they are at dealing with counter-examples, the more 
complex and gerrymandered they are likely to be), making it hard to 
understand why we would have a concept that referred to such a thing 
(cf. Hyman 1999), let alone care about it (cf. Kvanvig 2003).
The central proposal of Edward Craig’s highly influential book, 
Knowledge and the State of Nature (1990), is to offer an alternative 
approach to the study of knowledge, which is born of a sense of dis-
satisfaction with the standard epistemological projects of mainstream 
analytical theory of knowledge while anyway allowing intuitions to 
play a significant role in epistemological theorising. Craig’s approach 
has much more explanatory power than has been so far realised and a 
suitably modified Craigian project can satisfactorily address a num-
ber of otherwise puzzling features of our epistemological practice. 
Here I intend to exploit a Craig-inspired approach to address a fam-
ily of problems in contemporary analytical epistemology concerning 
the value of knowledge. In particular, this approach can explain why 
knowledge is more valuable than mere true belief and why it has a 
distinctive value. Significantly, the independently motivated account 
avoids a substantial revisionism with regard to the focus of epistemo-
logical inquiry that has recently been advanced, due to the growing 
pessimism concerning the ability of accounts of knowledge to cap-
ture what here I will call the value desideratum, a set of widespread 
ordinary intuitions and related commonsensical beliefs about the 
value of knowledge.
The paper proceeds as follows. In section I, I introduce the value de-
sideratum. In section II, I present the first key component of a Craigian 
approach and a novel practical explication of the concept of knowledge. 
In section III, I present the second main element of the approach and 
derive an account of knowledge from the previous practical explica-
tion. In section IV, I consider various value challenges. In section V, I 
show how the proposed account meets these challenges. In section VI, 
I offer some concluding remarks.
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I. The Value Desideratum
The value desideratum identifies pre-theoretically appealing phe-
nomena we ideally want to capture and explain. So this is a desideratum 
that we would prefer an account of knowledge to accommodate and it 
sets a specific explanatory goal for any such account. There are other 
desiderata, such as factivity (i.e. knowledge requires truth) and non-
accidentality (i.e. knowledge requires some sort of anti-luck condition), 
that are perhaps more widely recognised than this one, but recently 
“value-driven” epistemologists have rightly started to take it into ac-
count (cf. Riggs 2008). This renewed interest in the value of knowledge is 
a step in the right direction and any satisfactory account of knowledge 
should address the challenges set by this value desideratum (cf. Kvanvig 
2003; Zagzebski 1996). So let us introduce the relevant phenomena.
Knowledge is ordinarily thought to be valuable. Now, it seems 
easy to explain this phenomenon if we accept that we value the truth 
and knowledge requires it. Knowledge then is instrumentally valu-
able. Having said that, knowledge, we think, is also meant to be more 
valuable than true belief, as Plato notes (cf. Meno 97d). Indeed, Plato 
uses this fact to challenge us to explain why this is so, given that true 
belief is just as useful as knowledge. This challenge can suggest an ex-
planation that gives knowledge a non-instrumental kind of value (if 
no greater instrumental value can be given to it), which would be in 
line with a widespread conviction that knowledge has a special kind 
of value (cf. Greco 2011; Pritchard 2010). Indeed, the fact that “knowl-
edge has been the focus of so much of epistemological theorising, 
rather than some other epistemic standing like justified true belief,” 
(Pritchard 2009 19) is meant to suggest this. Nevertheless, we need 
to make sure that our explanation of the phenomena is compatible 
with the apparent lack of value of, say, immoral knowledge (cf. Baehr 
2009; Fricker 2009).
This desideratum for accounts of knowledge helps us evaluate 
their success and allows us to adjudicate between them. But this does 
not mean that an account is successful only if every desideratum is 
captured. A given desideratum may be given up if no reflective equi-
librium can be achieved and other options are more costly. So a set 
of desiderata should be seen more as a wish-list than a must-do-list. 
For example, with regard to the value-desideratum, Plato in the Meno 
briefly flirts with the idea of giving up the claim that knowledge is 
more valuable than true belief. But after Meno wonders whether this 
common view is mistaken, Socrates immediately points out that he 
is wondering this because he is not aware of the explanation, which, 
Socrates suggests, is that knowledge is more valuable because it is 
[ 91]
ideas y valores · vol. lxiv · n.o 159 • diciembre 2015 • issn 0120-0062 (impreso) 2011-3668 (en línea) • bogotá, colombia • pp. 87–107
Testimony and Value in the Theory of Knowledge
“tethered” or “stable” (Meno 97c-98a). We do not need to consider 
this view now, but just to notice that if an explanation that allows us 
to accommodate the desideratum is forthcoming, the account that 
delivers it is preferable to one that does not.
Anyway, a case could be made for abandoning a desideratum. But 
some desiderata (say, factivity) are less likely to be given up than oth-
ers (say, value), if based on stronger convictions. Not doing so would 
be, as David Lewis would say, a bigger blow to the credibility of one’s 
account. Preferably, though, we would want to accommodate all de-
siderata. So they have a central role to play in the process of reflective 
equilibration when trying to reach the most explanatory fruitful ac-
count. Moreover, part of what this theoretical fruitfulness requires is 
to explain why knowledge enjoys such features. So we do not merely 
want our account to agree, say, with the value of knowledge desidera-
tum, but also to explain why this is so.
II. Practical Explication
One main methodological innovation of the Craigian project is the 
use of a “practical explication of knowledge” to help us make sense of 
features of the target phenomenon (cf. Craig 1990 8; Butchvarov 1970). 
Craig holds that we should ask “what the concept of knowledge does 
for us, what its role in our life might be, and then ask what a concept 
having that role would be like” (2). According to Craig, this functional 
role, for epistemically interdependent social beings like ourselves, is to 
flag good informants (cf. 11; Williams 1973). Roughly, Craig’s story be-
gins with the need for the concept of a good informant in a primitive 
state of humankind and attempts to show how such concept, through 
a process of “objectivisation,” becomes our concept of knowledge. But 
many other suggestions have recently been made about other (related) 
roles (e.g. understood in terms of signalling out targets for blame (cf. 
Beebe 2012), terminating inquiry (cf. Kappel 2010a and Rysiew 2012), 
and encouraging good testimony (cf. Reynolds 2002)).
The plausible hypothesis I wish to explore is that the concept of 
knowledge picks out cases where the testimonial procedures of com-
petency to achieve the truth to be communicated are successful. So I 
implement the Craigian framework with a different hypothesis that is 
not susceptible to worries raised about Craig’s own (cf. Gelfert 2011; 
Kelp 2011) by doing without an imaginary state-of-nature genealogy 
and the need for an objectivisation of the concept (cf. Craig 1990 84 
ff.; Williams 2002 32 ff.). That is, neither is the story here offered a 
state-of-nature story, since we will not be necessarily describing some 
primitive state of the human condition, nor does it rely on a process 
of conceptual development, since we will not be describing how a 
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state-of-nature concept (of a good informant) evolves into the current 
concept (of knowledge).1 This seems in fact desirable since it is hard 
to assess the plausibility of state-of-nature and developmental stories, 
neither of which is anyway required for a practical explication (cf. 
Kappel 2010a). The offered hypothesis about the role of the concept of 
knowledge, just like Craig’s own, might be rejected if not considered 
plausible, and the more controversial the claims are, the less plausible 
the explication will tend to be. But, if plausible, the hypothesis should 
be judged ultimately on its theoretical fruits.
The Concept of Knowledge
Taking a cue from Craig then, the starting point is the hypothesis 
that the concept of knowledge is required to satisfy a certain need of 
ours. Of course, once we have the concept of knowledge, we might use 
it in a variety of different ways. But the idea is that there is a particular 
need that the concept is meant to satisfy that provides it with its point, 
which in turn helps us make sense of features of the target phenome-
non (cf. Kappel 2010a 70-73). And the suggestion is that this need arises 
out of the development of our fundamental and pervasive testimonial 
practice. More precisely, the concept of knowledge is the result of a 
conceptual need related to this practice. But plausibly assuming that 
the practice is developed and shaped by our need for truth, the ques-
tion arises as to why the concept of knowledge, as suggested, is needed.2
To answer this question, we need to think of the possibility of fail-
ure and success in testimony. From the speaker’s side, she can fail to 
engage in felicitous testimony by not being either sincere or competent 
(or both). But, in felicitous cases, neither being sincere nor competent 
entails that what is being told (p) is true. More particularly, competent 
performance does not pick out only those cases in which one achieves 
the truth. After all, most testimonial procedures we exploit to work 
out whether p are not likely to be perfectly truth-conducive given a 
1 So while Craig ś hypothesis requires objectivisation of a state-of-nature concept in 
order to deliver the concept of knowledge, the hypothesis here presented does not. For 
other differences between the hypotheses and for the need of the objectivisation in 
Craig ś case, see below “The Concept of Knowledge”.
2 Given our universal and inescapable need for truth (cf. Dretske 89) and our social and 
cooperative nature, the idea is that, in a socially interdependent lifestyle, the other 
members of the community can be sources of truths, which would be particularly 
beneficial for one in those cases in which they enjoy some “positional advantage” or 
expertise which one does not (one enjoys a “positional advantage” when one is better 
positioned, spatially and/or temporally, to find out whether p –Williams 2002 42–). 
Indeed, we constantly exploit each other’s “eyes and ears” in order to achieve the truth 
for the success of our actions. 
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reasonable feasibility constraint (otherwise the practice becomes use-
less). So testimonial competence is not factive.
Nevertheless, if one competently and sincerely testifies that p, then 
even if p is not the case, one is not to blame for such unsuccessful testi-
mony. But blameless testimony (viz. competent and sincere testimony) 
is not the aim of the practice. The practice is designed to deliver truth 
(or so we are assuming), and without it, the testimony, even if blameless, 
does not satisfy the practice’s goal. We want more from testimony than 
blamelessness. Indeed, successful testimony requires truth. So, given 
that we want to be able to refer to those cases of competence in which 
we do achieve the truth (i.e. those cases in which competence is suc-
cessful, given the practice’s goal), we seem to need a new concept. This 
concept picks out those cases of testimonial competence that succeed in 
achieving the truth and the suggestion is that such concept is knowledge.
The concept of knowledge is needed to pick out those successful 
cases in which the truth is achieved by means of procedures that render 
the testifier competent, and we refer to those cases as being “knowl-
edge” and to the individual who apprehends the truth in such a way 
as “knowing”. The basic idea on which this hypothesis rests, is that the 
verb  “know” is what Gilbert Ryle calls an “achievement word” (143), 
as opposed to a task word (compare finding to looking, and scoring to 
shooting). “Know” is a “verb of success” (cf. 125): a verb indicating the 
successful accomplishment of a task. The suggestion is that “know” is 
a verb that indicates success with regard to the competence task. That 
is, “know” indicates the possession of the truth by means of testimo-
nial competence procedures to work out whether p.
So the concept of knowledge addresses a particular conceptual need 
generated by our universal and pervasive testimonial practice. This need 
can provide us with a practical explication of the concept of knowledge 
that allows us to explain why the concept enjoys such widespread use 
(all known cultures engage in such practice and have such concept). 
And, to repeat, given that testimonial competence does not entail truth, 
we need the concept of knowledge to pick out the successful cases of 
competence. So, some concepts are required in connection with our 
testimonial practice, one of which is the success concept knowledge 
that picks out cases of testimonial competence that deliver the truth: 
that allows us to refer to these successful cases.3
3 For the sake of space, I will not of course have much to say about the nature of the 
testimonial procedures here. But notice that, given their regulatory function within 
this practice we foster, these are (socially) endorsed procedures that guide us in the 
acquisition of truths. So legitimate procedures will not only have to be de facto reliable 
(given the practice’s goal), but also (reasonably) approved by the epistemic community 
(to regulate such practice). These moreover can be taken as principles of justification 
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Now, it is important to notice two things to appreciate the plausibil-
ity of the hypothesis. First, due to the connection between testimonial 
competence and acceptance, the concept of knowledge also applies to 
hearers who felicitously acquire the truth via testimony, since a compe-
tent way to acquire the truth (given the regulation of testimony and the 
usual scenario involving chains of testimony) is by means of testimony. 
This way of acquiring the truth renders it fit for further transmission by 
the hearer. That is, some cases of competence are cases of acceptance. 
So we can also talk of hearers as knowing when accepting testimony.4
Second, we can also refer to individuals who are not involved in a 
testimonial exchange as knowing. That is, potential testifiers as well as 
individuals who are not trusted or who will not testify or who deceive 
us, can be thought as knowing. This is because, regardless of whether 
one transmits the truth and whether someone accepts it, if one compe-
tently achieves it, one qualifies as knowing. So the Mafioso, the liar and 
the Boy-that-cried-wolf can all be said to know, as we would expect.5
Moreover, even if we are right about the conceptual need that the 
concept of knowledge is meant to satisfy, the concept can still fulfill 
different roles. After all, once we have the concept, we might use it in 
a variety of different ways. Indeed, there are many other uses for it. 
Here are two: it allows us to flag good social sources of truth (i.e. those 
people who have knowledge: “She knows whether p,” when, say, one is 
aware of her positional advantage or expertise) and so to inquire for 
these social sources of truth (“Who knows whether p?”). But it does 
not seem needed, for this given tell-wh seems to be factive (consider: 
(in a very broad sense). This however does not mean that we can think that the con-
cept of justified true belief, where justification is understood either traditionally or 
reliabilistically, is the concept being explicated here. After all, “epistemic justification” 
is a technical term (which has been variously understood within epistemology –e.g. 
Swinburne 2001; Alston 2005–): we do not ordinarily talk of justified belief (although 
we talk about justified actions, plans and decisions –and only in subject-matters heavily 
connected to philosophy, such as jurisprudence, we find such talk of justified beliefs). This 
in fact suggests that the concept being explicated is the universal concept of knowledge 
since, as mentioned, all known cultures engage in testimony and ordinarily exploit the 
concept of knowledge but not that of epistemic justification. 
4 For similar reasons, we can also talk of hearers knowing when speakers are not com-
petent or sincere but the hearer can compensate for such deficiency. This would again 
be another competent way of acquiring the truth, though in these cases the speakers 
are better regarded as instruments, rather than testifiers, which can reliably afford us 
the truth with the appropriate correction (like any corrected faulty instrument would). 
5 Craig’s objectivisation is primarily required to capture these cases (cf. 82ff.). That is 
because the concept of a good informant concerns both the competence and the sincerity 
of the informant. However, the hypothesis here presented is only concerned with those 
cases of successful competence, hence there is no need for some such objectivisation. 
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“She can tell you whether p,” “Who can tell me whether p?”). The con-
cept also allows us to refer to those cases of felicitous testimony that 
transmit the truth. That is, it can help us pick out and mark the success 
of testimonial exchanges (“She let me know that p”); something that 
tell-that can’t do (“She told me that p”), hence allowing us to refer to 
infelicitous cases (“I was told that p but not-p,” “I told her that p, but 
I lied”). However, once again tell-wh can do this job, so know is not 
required for this either.
So these are some of the things that the concept of knowledge can 
do for us, but still the idea is that there is a particular need that the 
concept is meant to satisfy that provides it with its point. And the point 
of the concept (or, what the concept is for) is to allow us to pick out the 
successful cases of testimonial competence: that is, its purpose is to 
fulfill the need to pick out those success-cases. After all, the testimonial 
practice is to satisfy our basic need for truth, so a concept that allows 
us to pick out the truth when competent seems required. Anyhow, this 
is the plausible hypothesis I want to put forward. Importantly, the ac-
count of knowledge that we can derive from this practical explication 
has great explanatory power when it comes to the value desideratum, a 
case that will be made below.6 But, first, let us consider how this practi-
cal explication helps us understand what knowledge is.
III. Knowledge as a Social Kind
A second main component of this Craigian project is that knowl-
edge is a social kind: roughly, a category that human beings impose on 
the world (in response to central needs and interests). As Craig says, 
knowledge is “something that we delineate by operating with a concept 
which we create in answer to certain needs” (3). Hilary Kornblith com-
plains that Craig does not give us “a reason to believe that the category 
of knowledge is socially constructed rather than a natural kind” (49). 
But, firstly, it is not clear that knowledge could be regarded as a natu-
ral kind (cf. Brown 2012 41-45) and, secondly and more importantly, 
this is to be taken as a plausible methodological presupposition and 
the best way to proceed is to assume its correctness and see where it 
6 Of course I am not suggesting this is the only plausible hypothesis available. In fact, we 
have mentioned others above. Those hypotheses might be equally plausible for all I have 
said here. But I am not here trying to argue against these candidates. The aim is to show 
that the proposed hypothesis, which intimately links the concept of knowledge to our 
testimonial practice, has great theoretical fruits with regard to the value desideratum. 
It is a further issue whether the alternatives do so too. But notice that the hypothesis 
offered can also help us make sense of two further theses: that knowledge terminates 
the testimonial inquiry and is the norm of testimonial assertion (although I cannot 
argue for this here, I think those restrictions are welcomed: consider opining that p). 
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takes us (cf. Craig 4). After all, the most effective way to demonstrate 
the limitations of any approach, including the natural-kind one, is by 
developing a better alternative, and here I intend to contribute to the 
development of a Craig-inspired alternative. This approach should be 
judged ultimately on its theoretical fruits and my aim is to illustrate 
the great explanatory power it can enjoy with respect to central value 
issues regarding knowledge.
An Account of Knowledge
Given this methodological presupposition, knowledge, although 
a natural phenomenon, is the kind of phenomenon that we shape. So 
the suggestion, echoing Craig, is that the above success-concept, which 
satisfies a specific conceptual need generated by our basic and universal 
testimonial practice, delineates the phenomenon of knowledge. I sug-
gest then, rather schematically, that knowledge is the apprehension of 
the truth by means of truth-conducive procedures that are in place for 
testimonial competence. As mentioned, the best way to proceed is to 
assume its correctness and see where it takes us. I think that is a good 
place at least with respect to the value desideratum, and the case for 
this is presented below.
So, to know is to grasp the truth by means of certain norms, where 
these norms of knowledge are certain regulatory procedures of testi-
mony. It would be important to consider in some detail the nature of 
the testimonial practice, and particularly the nature of its regulatory 
rules, if we are to adequately understand what knowledge is.7 But that 
is not something we can do here and it is not something we need to do 
since, as it will become apparent later on, all we need to explain the 
value desideratum is this schematic proposal. So, with it on the table, 
we should now start considering the different value problems to which 
we would like answers.
IV. Value Problems
We would prefer our account of knowledge to explain the distinc-
tive value of knowledge that in turn explains why knowledge is valuable 
and more valuable than mere true belief. Again, the claim is not that 
any plausible account of knowledge must entail that knowledge is dis-
tinctively valuable. This desideratum is not non-negotiable. Having said 
that, it is preferable, given the widespread intuitions behind this desid-
eratum, to explain why knowledge has such value rather than explain 
our intuitions away (cf. Pritchard 2010 46). In these final sections we 
7 As suggested (fn.3), procedures are legitimate only if they are de facto reliable and 
socially endorsed. 
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shall see that the present account can capture the value desideratum, 
while noticing that some competitors fail to do so. But let us first set 
the terrain for our explanation.
We ordinarily think knowledge is valuable and this can be easily 
explained by the fact that we value the truth and that knowledge re-
quires it. But, knowledge, we think, is also more valuable than mere 
true belief. And, in the Meno (cf. 97d), Plato challenges us to explain 
why this is so given mere true belief is just as useful as knowledge 
(given that they seem equally instrumentally valuable with regard 
to the truth). We can respond to this challenge by either claiming a) 
that knowledge, which is merely instrumentally valuable because it 
delivers truth, does not have greater value than mere true belief, or 
b) that knowledge, which is instrumentally valuable because it deliv-
ers truth and “stability” or “resilience” over time, actually has greater 
instrumental value than mere true belief, or c) that knowledge is also 
non-instrumentally valuable.
I take the first strategy to be the least promising, given that it 
consists in denying a widespread commonsensical intuition about 
knowledge (cf. Greco 2010; Sosa 2010). Now, some disagree about the 
generality of the intuition, suggesting that this is not an exceptionless 
generalization (cf. Baehr 2009; Fricker 2009), and we shall come back 
to this below. But, granted that such denial of our ordinary thinking 
about knowledge is least desirable, the two main options are claiming 
that knowledge has greater instrumental value than mere true belief 
b) and claiming that knowledge is also non-instrumentally valuable 
c). The latter is the response the proposed account promotes, so let us 
first consider whether b) is a viable competitor to c) with respect to 
the above challenge.
Now, b) is in fact Socrates’ strategy in the Meno. He claims that 
knowledge, as opposed to mere true belief, is, metaphorically speaking, 
“tethered” and so it does not “run away,” like the statues of Daedalus. 
And this strategy has been adopted by others. Perhaps the most natural 
and plausible way to develop it is by suggesting that “mere true beliefs 
are typically more vulnerable to being lost in the face of mislead-
ing counter-evidence” (Fricker 129). This “stability” or “resilience” of 
knowledge (i.e. “the tendency to survive misleading counter-evidence 
owing to the subjects being in the position to weight it against posi-
tive evidence already possessed” (ibd.)) is meant to explain the added 
instrumental value over mere true belief, since one is more likely to 
hold on to the truth over time if one knows.
As Miranda Fricker points out, this explanation of the extra value 
of knowledge becomes available as soon as one gives up the “synchronic 
presumption” normally implicitly accepted in the current debate. This 
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is the presumption that “the value question is […] a question about the 
comparative values of mere true belief and knowledge at a snapshot in 
time [or, at best,] in a very short time frame” (Fricker 127). I am sym-
pathetic to Fricker’s approach; in particular to a change in perspective: 
in this case, from a synchronic to a diachronic one. And, the proposed 
Craig-inspired account promotes another change of focus: from an in-
dividualist perspective to a social one, where the “the realities of social 
interaction” (Kvanvig 1992 178) are not neglected. This change of focus, 
as we shall see, allows us to fully deal with the various value problems 
here considered (cf. Fricker 136-137).
Anyway, I also think this resilience can explain why sometimes 
knowledge can have more instrumental value than mere true belief. But, 
as Fricker is aware, if that is the full story, then the intuition (if correct) 
cannot be general: that is, knowledge is not always more (instrumen-
tally) valuable than true belief. This is because, as Fricker and many 
others think, having evidence or reasons is not a necessary condition 
of knowledge.8 We do not always have evidence for our knowledge and 
so such knowledge lacks the added instrumental value that resides in 
resilience. That is, we do not always enjoy, in cases of knowledge, the 
ability to retain truths over time in the face of misleading evidence.
Now, I think this resilience explanation is not the full story for two 
reasons: a) the independent reasons for thinking that the intuition is 
not general do not seem compelling, and b) it is not clear that this story 
can explain why we would have a widespread intuition that knowledge 
is more valuable than mere true belief. Let us take them in that order.
So let us consider whether the reasons for thinking that the intuition 
is not general are compelling a). Jason Baehr and Fricker provide some 
independent reasons for holding the non-generality of the intuition. 
Firstly, “there is nothing independently or inherently counterintui-
tive in the suggestion that there might exist, say, at least one item of 
8 Below we shall see that this seems correct, but for the time being note that Fricker is 
in good company from different epistemological standpoints: cf. Ayer 1956; Goldman 
1979; Lewis 1996; Millar 2010. Notice too that the sort of evidence that concerns us 
here (i.e. the evidence that would allows us to defeat misleading counter-evidence 
by weighting them against each other) cannot simply be, say, the appearance of a 
memory, since mere true beliefs stored in memory will share this appearance. Neither 
can we take the truth-conducive procedures as evidence (or reasons) in the required 
sense unless they are “internalised” (in the sense of having reflective access to the fact 
that the procedure one is exploiting is truth-conducive), but we should not normally 
expect this to be the case (and neither does the above account suggest that to be the 
case). That “internalisation” would prove to be too demanding and taking the de facto 
truth-conducive procedures to be evidence would seem to flout ordinary usage and, 
more importantly, such external evidence would not count as the sort of evidence that 
can guide the maintenance of beliefs when presented with counter-evidence. 
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knowledge the value of which fails to exceed that of the corresponding 
item of true belief” (Baehr 48). Secondly, trivial knowledge and im-
moral knowledge are meant to be in fact cases where such possibility 
is actualised (cf. Baehr 49-50; Fricker 135).
Now, in response to the first point, one can say that, given that 
something’s value can be outweighed or defeated, there is no reason 
to think that knowledge is always valuable all-things-considered. So, 
for example, the moral disvalue of a certain belief could defeat any (in-
strumental or otherwise) epistemic value it may have and so bring the 
value of it as true belief and as knowledge to naught. In this way then, 
we would have a case where the item of knowledge is not more valuable 
all-things-considered than the mere true belief. So, given that epis-
temic value (instrumental or otherwise) can be defeated, we can agree 
that there is nothing inherently counter-intuitive with the idea that an 
item of knowledge can fail to be more valuable all-things-considered 
than the relevant true belief. But this does not rule out the possibility 
that knowledge is more valuable than true belief within the epistemic 
realm, which is the content of, what we might call, our Meno intuition.9
But, what can we say about cases of trivial knowledge where, say, 
no moral disvalue defeats the epistemic value? The thing to say is that 
it is not clear (at least to me) that trivial knowledge is not more valu-
able than the corresponding trivial true belief. That is, intuitively, 
trivial knowledge does not seem to actualise the possibility that the 
item of knowledge does not have more value than the mere true belief. 
But Baehr might protest. Indeed, he wonders why I would be better 
off knowing that p rather than merely truly believing it if the subject-
matter is not of any epistemic interest to me (cf. 49-50). At this point, 
let me just say that when we consider the value of knowledge but do 
not only acknowledge the individual’s benefits and interests, Baehr’s 
concern seems misplaced. The extra value of knowledge need not be 
explained only in terms of the value it has to the individual. If one gives 
up the individualist presumption that is behind this concern, it is not 
clear that there is a problem: after all, what matters is not whether one 
is interested on some truth but whether someone can be.10
9 What I am calling the “Meno intuition” (exegetical issues aside) is not the claim that 
knowledge is more valuable all-things-considered than true belief. I take it there is a 
widespread intuition that knowledge is more valuable as an epistemic good than mere 
true belief. 
10 Given that the testimonial practice is developed in order to satisfy the fundamental 
human need for truths by means of other people, testimonial competence aims at the 
truth that is then passed on to someone else who needs it. And one need not be too 
ingenious to think of cases in which even the most trivial or unbeneficial truth, from 
someone’s perspective, can be needed by someone else. Any truth is possibly needed 
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Let us now turn to the second reason why the above resilience ex-
planation does not seem to be the full story, namely: that it is not clear 
that this resilience story can explain why we would have a widespread 
intuition that knowledge is more valuable than mere true belief b). Given 
that we do have such intuition, it is difficult to see how this resilience 
can explain why we have it unless such resilience is, at least, a typical 
feature of knowledge. But the possession of evidence required for resil-
ience (i.e. the sort of evidence that would allow us to defeat misleading 
counter-evidence) does not seem to be a typical feature of knowledge. 
Indeed, much knowledge does not seem to require it.
A lot of our knowledge is stored in memory and a lot of knowledge 
is gained via testimony. But it seems that memory and testimony can 
require positive reasons (as opposed to the absence of negative ones) 
only at the expense of significantly reducing what we take to know. 
On the one hand, much testimony comes from strangers (about which 
we know nothing) and even in those cases where it does not, we do 
not normally seem to be able to provide positive reasons for the testi-
mony. On the other hand, even if our beliefs were initially supported 
by reasons, we often, after a time (and perhaps so not to clutter the 
memory), lose them and retain merely the belief. So, assuming we can 
know what we remember even if we have forgotten the evidence for it 
and what we are being felicitously told when lacking evidence, having 
evidence of the sort required for resilience (i.e. evidence that would 
allows us to defeat misleading counter-evidence by weighting them 
against each other) seems neither a necessary nor a typical condition 
of knowledge (and there is no reason to suppose we would think so), 
which makes one wonder why we have the intuition that knowledge 
is more valuable than mere true belief. So we do not seem able to ex-
plain away the generality of the Meno intuition this way. That is, the 
extra truth-dependent value that resilience affords us by adopting a 
diachronic perspective is not enough to explain away the generality 
of the Meno intuition.
These considerations suggest that the above resilience explana-
tion is not the full story. And it seems that if we are to capture the 
phenomena on the matter, we need to explain why knowledge is more 
valuable than mere true belief as a matter of kind: we need to explain 
how knowledge can (also) be non-instrumentally valuable c).11 The 
by someone. So any truth, however trivial or unbeneficial for one, can be required to 
satisfy someone else’s need. But this does not mean that truths that are, from one’s 
perspective, trivial and unbeneficial are practically valuable for oneself. 
11 Of course we have not considered all possible alternatives within strategy b), but just 
what I consider to be the most natural and promising development of such a strategy. 
To show that strategy c) is the only one available to explain the extra value of knowled-
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present account, which is not incompatible with the above resilience 
story, suggests an answer to Plato’s challenge that exemplifies the third 
strategy by exploiting the intimate connection between knowledge and 
testimony here suggested and so can do justice to our intuitions. That 
is, the proposed account provides us with an explanation that gives 
knowledge a non-instrumental kind of epistemic value that is enjoyed 
by all knowledge. So this story allows us to explain why knowledge is 
distinctively valuable: where the difference in value between knowl-
edge and true belief is not (just) a matter of degree but of kind. This is 
also thought to be a widely held conviction (cf. Greco 2011; Pritchard 
2009), and if it is so (as I think it is12), our account can capture it too.
But before I introduce the proposed explanation, let us make clear 
the different value problems that we would prefer an answer to (cf. Greco 
2011; Kappel 2010b; Sosa 2010). First, we would like an answer to the 
General Value problem: that is, to explain why knowledge is valuable. 
Second, we would like an answer to the Meno problem: that is, to ex-
plain why knowledge is more valuable as an epistemic good than mere 
true belief. Third, we would like an answer to the Distinctive Value 
problem: that is, to explain why knowledge is distinctively valuable.
The latter is the challenge to explain why knowledge has non-in-
strumental value or “final value” (Pritchard 2010 8).13 Now, significantly 
for our purposes, final value does not entail intrinsic value, since final 
value can be had due to relational, as opposed to intrinsic, proper-
ties. As Duncan Pritchard says, “intrinsic value concerns only the 
value generated by the intrinsic properties of the target item, and yet 
something can be finally –i.e. non-instrumentally– valuable because 
of its relational (and hence non-intrinsic) properties” (2010 fn. 30; cf. 
Kappel 2010b). So we want to explain how knowledge is finally valu-
able, so understood. These then are the three challenges to which we 
ge over mere true belief, we would also need to consider other plausible alternatives 
within b). Having said that, notice that if we also want to explain the distinctive value 
of knowledge, as I take it we should (but see fn.12), then neither the above resilience 
story nor any other story instantiating strategy b) will suffice to explain both the extra 
and the distinctive value of knowledge. 
12 But not everyone agrees (cf. Fricker 127fn.9) and some have doubts (cf. Kappel 2010b 
190-191). Note anyway the present account is not tailored to answer this challenge, so 
if there is no such intuition, it would not have moulded our account. Nevertheless, we 
shall see a reason for thinking there is one (§V). 
13 While this challenge assumes that knowledge has a distinctive value, the Meno one 
does not. Although, as pointed out above, the Meno problem can be solved by positing 
some distinctive value. After all, the Meno problem consists in the challenge to explain 
the extra value of knowledge, which can be done (and perhaps should be done, given 
the above –Pritchard cf. 2010 8 fn.11–) by means of some extra non-instrumental value. 
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want an answer and which, as we shall now see, the present account 
satisfactorily addresses.
V. The Final Value of Knowledge
As mentioned, the intimate connection between knowledge and 
testimony allows us to handle the above value problems: that is, to 
make sense of the value of knowledge including its distinctiveness and 
its extra value when compared to mere true belief. More precisely, the 
present account promotes an answer to the Distinctive Value problem 
that in turn allows us to address the other ones. After all, if knowledge 
has final value, knowledge is valuable and it is so finally and instru-
mentally, so it is more valuable than mere true belief given that such 
belief does not enjoy the final value as knowledge. Moreover, the fact 
that our account prompts us to posit some such final value is welcomed 
since, as seen, the Meno problem seems to require an explanation that 
gives knowledge a non-instrumental kind of value.
Now, the extra value of knowledge over true belief can derive from 
relational properties that the true belief in question enjoys as an item 
of knowledge but not as mere true belief. I want to suggest that such 
relational property, given that the proposed account states that the con-
stitutive norms of knowledge are procedures of the testimonial practice, 
is that the true belief as knowledge is fit for the testimonial practice. In 
other words, an item of knowledge is finally valuable as a suitable item 
of the testimonial practice. This is an epistemic cooperative practice 
that is of fundamental importance in our lives. A social practice that 
we most certainly value (cf. Kusch 2009): after all, it seems required for 
both personal and communal flourishing, and so we value it both as 
individuals and as a community. And the fact that a true belief as an 
item of knowledge is fit for such practice renders it finally valuable. That 
is, just like a dress can enjoy final value because it was worn by Diana 
(a relational property of the dress), similarly a true belief can enjoy fi-
nal value because it is fit for transmission in our testimonial practice.14
So, given the present account, all knowledge is essentially related to 
testimony and this relation is what makes a true belief that is knowledge 
distinctively valuable. Importantly, all knowledge enjoys such distinc-
tive value. So by focusing on this relational property of all true beliefs 
as knowledge, we can handle both the Meno and the Distinctive Value 
14 This of course does not mean that all true beliefs enjoy such final value, but only 
that those true beliefs that are knowledge do: that is, a true belief fit for testimonial 
consumption. After all, what makes a true belief enjoy such value is that it is formed 
by means of a testimonial procedure (i.e. a competence procedure for the testimonial 
practice). But of course not all true beliefs are obtained in that manner (consider, for 
instance, forming a true belief by guesswork or wishful thinking). 
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problems. This is how we exploit a social perspective, which does not 
neglect the realities of social interaction, on the issue: by focusing on the 
essential connection between knowledge and testimony. The extra and 
distinctive value of knowledge is explained by reference to testimony.
This is the proposed explanation of knowledge’s extra and final 
value, which moreover allows us to suggest that knowledge is a common 
good. Indeed, knowledge is a common good that is crucial, although 
contingently so, to the well-being of humans and communities: a funda-
mental exercise of our social nature (cf. Kusch 2009 61 ff.). And thinking 
of knowledge as a commons or a public good like shared natural re-
sources (such as water, forests and fisheries), which is in line with our 
commonsensical idea of a social reservoir of knowledge,15 allows us to 
easily pump (pace Fricker) the intuition that it enjoys some final value.
So we can handle, due to the nature of the proposed explanation, 
all three value problems. By explaining how knowledge enjoys final 
value, and so addressing the Distinctive Value problem, we can also 
explain the Meno problem: the extra value is this final value. And so, as 
required by the General Value problem, we can explain why knowledge 
is valuable: it enjoys both instrumental and final value. Consequently, 
the present account is to be preferred, all else being equal, to any account 
that fails to explain either why knowledge is valuable, or more valuable 
than mere true belief, or distinctively valuable. And it seems that other 
accounts of knowledge cannot do so. Some are not designed to do so 
(cf. Fricker 2009 127-128) and others designed to do so do not seem to 
be successful (cf. Greco 2010 91-101). More specifically, some believe that 
“the most promising account available of why knowledge […] is finally 
valuable” (Pritchard 2010 48) seems unable to do so. The type of account 
being referred to understands knowledge as a cognitive achievement 
of the subject through her virtues.16 But I will not rehearse the alleged 
problems of this type of account (cf. Lackey 2007, 2009; Pritchard 2010 
34-43), since it is not my aim here to show that the proposed account is 
the only one able to handle fully the value-desideratum.17
15 That is, a common fund, in which we differentiate different branches or fields, to be 
exploited by anyone. So, for example, London cab drivers speak of “the knowledge,” 
and so does the British Library, but of course referring to other domains. 
16 Given that knowledge is a cognitive achievement and that achievements are finally 
valuable, this account seems to have the resources to explain why knowledge is finally 
valuable and so also handle the other two value problems. 
17 Plus doing so would require us, given the nature of the criticisms raised against the credit 
account (i.e. either it captures the value or the non-accidentality desideratum, but not 
both), to consider whether the proposed account also captures the non-accidentality 
desideratum. But I have anyway argued elsewhere (De Brasi, forthcoming) that this 
account can do so. 
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Instead, I am here mainly concerned with showing some theoretical 
fruits of the proposed account and one of its advantages is that it can 
explain, due to the distinctive value of knowledge, why epistemologists 
throughout the times have cared so much about knowledge. Moreover, 
it does not require a substantial revisionism with regard to such focus, 
like revisionist accounts demand. That is, revisionist accounts, which 
deny that all knowledge is more valuable than mere true belief and has 
final value and which explain away the relevant intuitions (cf. Pritchard 
2010 66-88), demand a meta-epistemological revision with regard to 
the focus of the epistemological inquiry. But the proposed account can 
do justice to the value desideratum and so pessimism concerning the 
ability of an account of knowledge to capture our widespread ordinary 
intuitions and beliefs about the value of knowledge is misplaced. So we 
can explain why knowledge has enjoyed and still (correctly) enjoys the 
central focus it does in epistemology. And since we prefer an account 
that can capture the value desideratum, I suggest that, all else being 
equal, the proposed account should be preferred to value-revisionist 
accounts.
Fundamental Epistemic Goods and the Swamping Problem
Before concluding, let me address one final and infamous prob-
lem that is normally thought to be an especially difficult problem for 
reliabilist accounts to handle (cf. Jones 1997; Zagzebski 1996). So, given 
that the proposed account has reliabilist elements, I want to make clear 
why it does not suffer from this problem.18
But first let me make clear that, given that a fundamental epis-
temic good is “any epistemic good whose epistemic value is at least 
sometimes not simply instrumental value relative to a further epis-
temic good” (Pritchard 2010 11-12) and granted that knowledge has 
final (non-instrumental) value, knowledge is a fundamental epistemic 
good. That is, since an epistemic good with final value also qualifies as 
a fundamental epistemic good due to the non-instrumental nature of 
its value, knowledge qualifies as some such good.
Now, given that the “swamping problem” is the problem to find an 
extra value for true belief as knowledge that “is not swamped by the 
value of truth itself” (Kvanvig 2003 46), it should be clear that the pres-
ent account certainly does not suffer this problem, since we handled the 
Meno problem. But I want to make clear why the present account, does 
18 Recall that the competence procedures are legitimate norms of knowledge only if they 
are truth-conducive (cf. fn.3). After all, the testimonial practice is meant to deliver truths 
and its regulative procedures are meant to promote the satisfaction of the practice’s 
goal. 
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not suffer from it. And in order to appreciate this we need to introduce 
two crucial assumptions behind the alleged problem.
The first is that the end, and not the means, is all that matters: 
“there is no further value in the fact that some particular true belief 
was produced by the reliable mechanism” (Zagzebski 1996 302). A 
common way of developing the point is by means of analogy: just like 
a reliable espresso machine does not add value to a good cup of coffee, 
neither does a truth-conducive process to a true belief (Zagzebski 2003 
15). In other words, the end (true belief) swamps the means (reliable 
method) of any value. The second assumption is that truth is the only 
fundamental epistemic good (cf. Kappel 2010b 187-188).
Given these two assumptions, simple reliabilist accounts seems to 
lack the resources to explain the Meno problem because, given that a 
true belief has already achieved the only fundamental epistemic goal, 
the fact that it is achieved by means of a reliable process will not add 
any extra value. That is, since knowledge is not “closer” to the goal of 
truth than mere true belief, there is no extra value to be had. This is the 
problem but, of course, there is room for the reliabilist to manoeuvre.
Mainly, she can reject either the first assumption (by introduc-
ing an extra value that is instrumental relative to the truth, say, along 
the lines of the above diachronic move) or the second one, just like we 
have done. Knowledge is a fundamental epistemic good: the property 
of being knowledge adds value to mere true belief. And the final value 
of knowledge, which exploits the relation between the true belief as 
knowledge and our testimonial practice, explains why the swamping 
problem does not apply to the proposed account. Moreover, this final 
value allows us, to repeat, to capture the value desideratum.
VI. Conclusion
We have seen that the proposed account manages to deal with the 
different value problems that have recently troubled epistemologists. 
I, of course, anticipate costs to this account, but with regard to the 
value desideratum it seems to come up on top. Indeed, the proposed 
Craig-inspired approach provides a framework where various philo-
sophical questions and puzzles about the value of knowledge become 
less problematic. I take this to be a sign of the fecundity of a Craig-style 
epistemological project to understand and explain a range of features 
of knowledge and a reason to further develop this sort of approach. 
Indeed, this approach grants a fuller engagement with the sort of so-
cial issues to which traditional epistemology is often blind given its 
strongly individualist orientation. It alleviates the worry that contem-
porary epistemology has missed an important component, aside from 
value considerations, to understanding the nature of knowledge by 
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not neglecting the realities of social interaction. After all, as Jonathan 
Kvanvig says, “we should never begin to think that the deepest episte-
mological questions concern the isolated intellect” (1992 177).
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